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citizens in a democracy. Prominent approaches to epistemic democracy, epistocracy, epistemic 
libertarianism, and pure proceduralism are examined through the lens of this taxonomy. The 
primary aim is to explore options for developing an account of the epistemic responsibilities of 
citizens in a democracy. The chapter also argues that a number of recent attacks on democracy 
may not adequately register the availability of a minimal approach to the epistemic 
responsibilities of citizens in a democracy.  
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1. Introduction  
Does democratic participation come with a responsibility to be informed about politics? What 
about a responsibility to think rationally, or be open-minded and intellectually virtuous in other 
ways when engaging in political deliberation? To what extent are ordinary citizens informed, 
rational, and intellectually virtuous when engaging in politics?  
Questions at the intersection of democratic theory and epistemology go back at least as 
far as Plato, and have remained a central focus of political philosophy throughout history. More 
recently, they have been taken up in empirically informed ways by political theorists, 
economists, and cognitive psychologists. For example, a vast empirical literature probes the 
extent to which citizens of large representative democracies tend to be ignorant1 or uninformed 
about political matters. Numerous other studies examine the cognitive behaviour of individual 
citizens when deliberating about politics (Brennan 2020; Somin 2020).  
 
1 I use the term “ignorant” to cover both the false belief sense of ignorant and the lack of belief sense. I use the term 
“irrational” to denote a further epistemic lack, one having to do with lack of evidential support.  
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This chapter seeks to provide a roadmap through some of this complex terrain. It does so 
by developing a taxonomy, dividing the terrain into three broad stances on the “epistemic 
responsibilities” of citizens in a democracy. I call these stances non-epistemicism, optimism, and 
pessimism. Each stance represents a kind of extreme in a matrix of possible views about the 
relationship between the epistemic responsibilities, if any, that democratic participation generates 
for citizens, and the epistemic competences that those citizens have. I examine how recent 
approaches to epistemic democracy, epistocracy, epistemic libertarianism, and pure 
proceduralism fit within this three-pronged taxonomy. My main aim is to explore the options for 
developing an account of the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. I also aim to 
shed light on how there is considerable room for a fairly minimal approach to epistemic 
responsibilities of citizens in a democracy—one that, in my view, a number of theorists have not 
adequately registered in their recent attacks on democracy. 
 
2. The Taxonomy  
John is a citizen of a large representative democracy electing a new federal government. One of 
the key policy differences between parties in the election concerns action on climate change. As 
part of his voting deliberations, John has done some careful research on what climate change is 
and what’s causing it. He’s also done some research on what each of the parties proposes to do 
about climate change. He’s thought and discussed open-mindedly and critically with others about 
how effective each of those proposals would be if adopted. He’s done something similar 
regarding other platform differences on issues he’s inclined to find important. As a result of all 
this research and discussion, John prefers party A over party B, and his vote will reflect this. 
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In at least some respects, John is a relatively rare citizen. Not very many of us have the 
time or energy to be as epistemically diligent in deciding who to vote for. Many of us simply 
vote for a particular party out of habit, or because of some deep commitment that tends to 
override specifics on issues of the day (Gabriel Lenz 2012; Mason 2018). Yet there is something 
intuitive about the idea that John is, at least with respect to these features of his voting behaviour, 
an example of responsible democratic participation. We can couch the idea that John is an 
example of responsible democratic participation in terms of the notion of a “political epistemic 
responsibility” (PER):  
 
PER: a defeasible responsibility to meet certain epistemic criteria in contributing to the 
democratic decision-making process. 
 
The idea is that John is an example of responsible democratic participation at least partly because 
he lives up to his PERs, whatever those are exactly.  
This definition of a PER is very open-ended. Many of the important details in the 
discussion to follow concern what these epistemic criteria are, and what the nature of this 
putative responsibility is, among other things. For example, here is one distinction to draw 
between two senses of “responsibility” that may be at play when talking about PERs: 
 
R(functional): X is an R(functional) responsibility of S’s only if X is a necessary 
condition S must meet in order to successfully play S’s role in contributing to the goal(s), 
aim(s), or function(s) of practice Y.  
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R(normative): X is an R(normative) responsibility of S’s only if X is a necessary 
condition S must meet in order to successfully play S’s role in contributing to the 
goals(s), aim(s), or function(s) of practice Y, and Y ought to be practiced.  
  
Assume for the sake of argument that at least one central aim or goal of democratic decision-
making is to represent the interests of the majority of citizens (we might have this aim for many 
reasons—including epistemic ones). If a necessary condition on achieving this aim is that each 
citizen (or some percentage of citizens) is informed about P in coming to believe that party A, 
and not B, will best promote their interests (and voting on that basis), then we might say that 
being informed about P is an R(functional) of those citizens, vis-à-vis this putative aim of 
democracy. If it turns out this process of democratic decision-making is a practice that genuinely 
ought to be practiced, perhaps meeting those epistemic conditions is an R(normative) for those 
citizens. For the most part, I wish to remain neutral on whether democracy is something that 
ought to be practiced. So, I leave it an open question whether the responsibilities at play when I 
speak of PERs are R(functional) or R(normative).  
My primary concern is to categorize possible views about the epistemic responsibilities 
of citizens in a democracy along two broad axes. The first axis is about demands: Does the 
practice of democratic participation in some way generate PERs? If so, what kind, and for 
whom? The second axis is about competences: what sorts of epistemic competences do citizens 
in a democracy actually tend to have? Do they tend to be informed about politics, and/or to 
deliberate rationally in forming political beliefs? Under what conditions?  
If we divide views along each axis into two opposing extremes, we generate three 
broadly different camps of interest (differences on the epistemic abilities axis between 
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proponents of non-epistemicism (those who hold that democratic participation does not generate 
PERs for citizens) do not really matter for our purposes). Actual views held by political theorists 
and philosophers about the nature and value2 of democracy tend to fall somewhere in a matrix 
between the extremes represented in the following chart: 
 
 Competences 
Citizens tend to be epistemically 
competent 















-aggregative epistemic democrats 












-classical deliberative democrats 
 
In the next few sections, I examine forms of non-epistemicism, pessimism, and optimism, 
highlighting some of the main commitments and motivations of thinkers who’ve defended views 
in democratic theory that fit within one or another of these categories.  
 
3. Non-Epistemicism 
Much recent literature at the intersection of political theory and epistemology focuses on the 
amount of political ignorance and irrationality we seem to find amongst citizens in large 
representative democracies. Many of us are familiar with references to survey data detailing a 
supposedly staggering degree of ignorance about even the most basic “politically relevant” facts 
 
2 Theorists are often interested in more specific issues, such as the legitimacy, authority, or justification of 
democracy. I wish to remain neutral on those issues, so I simply discuss views insofar as they defend or challenge 
the claim that democracy is in some broad sense a good idea.   
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amongst a large percentage of the American electorate. Ilya Somin offers the following claims as 
paradigm examples: “Much of the time, only a bare majority [of Americans] know which party 
has control of the Senate, some 70 percent cannot name both of their state’s senators, and the 
majority cannot name any congressional candidate in their district at the height of a campaign” 
(Somin 2013: 19). “A 2006 Zogby poll found that only 42 percent of Americans could even 
name the three branches of the federal government: executive, legislative, and judicial” (Somin 
2013: 19).  
We might take these results to suggest, prima facie, that if citizens have PERs, whatever 
they are exactly, then citizens must surely fall seriously short of meeting them. We might also 
wonder what, if anything, should be done about that. I will get to an assessment of the relevance 
of such survey data to questions about PERs shortly. For now, a natural alternative reaction 
might be to shrug one’s shoulders. Why think citizens have PERs in the first place? From the 
point of view of the value of democracy, perhaps it’s neither here nor there how informed and 
rational people are about politics (or anything else). 
A longstanding tradition in democratic theory defends the value of democracy in terms of 
the intrinsic value of things like fairness, liberty, and equality. What matters, according to this 
tradition, is that democratic procedures—authorizing laws by voting, or electing representative 
legislators—are fair, or respect individual liberty, or have other intrinsically valuable properties. 
This approach to democratic theory—often referred to as “pure proceduralism”—would seem to 
entail, or at least leave open, the view about the PERs of citizens in a democracy that I call non-
epistemicism. 
One form of pure proceduralism is fair proceduralism. The basic idea is that voting is a 
fair procedure for making collective decisions amongst people who disagree. As long as 
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everyone has an equal role to play in determining the outcome, the outcome has value (and may 
even have the power to render laws legitimate and authoritative), regardless of how we assess it 
by other, procedure-independent standards.  
An advantage of this approach is that it renders unnecessary the potentially messy 
business of determining what procedure-independent criteria to use in assessing the value of 
democratically produced outcomes. It also seems immune to worries about voter ignorance. As 
David Estlund points out: “A procedure can be fair to participants whether or not they are smart, 
or well informed, or virtuous” (Estlund 2008: 66). For my purposes, this is the main point. The 
fact that a procedure can be fair, irrespective of facts about epistemic competences of citizens, 
and the fact that fair proceduralism grounds the value of democratically determined outcomes on 
the idea that those outcomes are the result of a fair procedure, seems to imply that democratic 
participation does not, in its own right, generate PERs for citizens. In other words, pure 
proceduralism—at least of this paradigmatic variety—seems at odds with the idea that there are 
PERs. Hence it is a kind of non-epistemicism.3 
 
4. Pessimism  
Much recent democratic theory has taken a more instrumentalist turn. There are well-known 
critiques as well as defenses of democracy that hinge, in part, on an instrumentalist turn. By 
instrumentalist, I mean the idea that the value of democracy should be judged according to 
procedure-independent criteria, perhaps in addition to procedural criteria. For example, an 
instrumentalist might maintain that a democratic decision-making procedure has value only if it 
 
3 Early forms of deliberative democracy emphasise the intrinsic value of a “reasonable exchange” of viewpoints and 
ideas, where “reasonable exchange” is not intended to be understood with reference to procedure-independent 
criteria. These approaches might best be classified under non-epistemicism.  
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is more likely (under certain conditions) to lead to a “correct” outcome than a non-democratic 
decision-making procedure, such as oligarchy, or dictatorship. Recall John and the difference 
between party A and party B on climate change. The idea of a correct outcome is that one of 
these parties has the correct view about what to do about climate change.4 Instrumentalists may 
also focus on the tendency of democracy to produce morally good laws, or other practical 
benefits. In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on epistemic forms of instrumentalism.  
Starting with critiques of democracy, one form of pessimism is embodied in a view we 
can call “epistemic libertarianism”. Epistemic libertarians, such as Ilya Somin (2013) and Bryan 
Caplan (2007), have argued that we should abandon centralized governments in favour of highly 
decentralized federal states; we should minimize and localize government, and leave more 
decision making to the free-market. As Somin puts it, we should minimize centralized 
governments to make more room for “foot voting”, the process by which citizens who dislike the 
policies they live under pursue improvement by literally moving to a jurisdiction with more 
favourable policies (Somin 2013: 119-155). The primary basis for their proposals is an epistemic 
one.  
These theorists take the survey data mentioned above very much to heart (Somin 2013: 
17-61; Caplan: 50-94). According to epistemic libertarians, if the electorate resembles—even 
remotely—the picture we get from political knowledge survey data, then that electorate should 
not be guiding the political decision-making process, at least not in the way it does in a 
representative democracy. In addition to relying on such survey results, Somin and Caplan 
 
4 We can distinguish between claims about the proper aims of democratic decision-making (e.g. should we reduce 
human impact on climate change?) and claims about the means to those aims (e.g. how to reduce human impact on 
climate change?). Many, though by no means all, instrumentalists are wary of talking about correct answers to ends-
type (value-laden) questions. For sake of space I bracket this issue. 
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defend the idea that, in societies with large populations and fairly centralized governments, we 
should expect citizens to be massively politically ignorant and irrational. Epistemic libertarians 
take a cue from Anthony Downs (1957), arguing that political ignorance is instrumentally 
rational. According to Downs (and others), the rationality of political ignorance is an upshot of 
the nature of voting in a representative democracy with millions of voters; it’s an upshot of the 
fact that the chances of an individual citizen’s vote being a deciding factor in an election or 
referendum are near zero. The idea is that this has a significant impact on citizens’ incentive to 
be informed about whatever it is they are voting on. Caplan takes the claim further, arguing it is 
instrumentally rational for voters to be (epistemically) irrational in forming political beliefs 
(Caplan 2007: 114-142). The idea is that it makes more sense, from the point of view of practical 
rationality, to succumb to biases and prejudices that protect one’s sense of self and identity, 
when forming political beliefs, than it does to try to form beliefs that are carefully proportioned 
to the evidence. According to epistemic libertarians, citizens in smaller, federalized and free-
market driven societies would have greater incentive to remain informed and rational in their 
political deliberations.5 
Another form of pessimism is embodied in “epistocracy”. Like epistemic libertarians, the 
most prominent contemporary advocate of epistocracy, Jason Brennan, tends to place a lot of 
store in survey data about political ignorance, as well as worries about the rationality of citizens 
in forming political beliefs (often for similar reasons) (Brennan 2016: 23-74; cf. Lopez-Guerra 
2014: Ch.2). Brennan differs, however, in the conclusions he draws from these worries. Rather 
than recommending shrinking government and leaving more decisions to the free market, 
 
5 Some have argued that we should not expect voters to become significantly more informed of about political issues 
and their governments even if these become downsized and de-centralized (Christiano 2015).  
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epistocracy recommends adopting legal restrictions on who can vote, how votes are counted, or 
how individual votes ultimately contribute to democratic decision-making processes. Epistocratic 
approaches to restricting the franchise range from J.S. Mill’s epistocracy of the educated (plural 
votes for the “educated”), to voter competence exams, to universal suffrage with “epistemic 
veto”, whereby a “cognitively elite” body has the opportunity to veto decisions it deems 
unjustified or bad (“malicious, incompetent, or unreasonable”) (Brennan 2016: 204-231; see 
Brennan (2020) for a defense of “enlightened preference voting”).  
Setting the details of these positive proposals aside, both epistemic libertarians and 
epistocrats suggest a picture according to which it is democracy, or more specifically, the kind of 
democratic participation involved in large representative democracies, that generates the sorts of 
PERs that citizens are supposedly not to be able to meet. By advocating for epistocracy, Brennan 
effectively advocates for a political system in which low-competence citizens no longer have 
PERs, because they are no longer voters. By advocating for “foot voting”, Caplan and Somin 
effectively advocate for a political system in which low-competence citizens have a lot less to 
think about (and a lot more incentive to try harder), because they are voting on much more local 
issues. We can draw out claims about PERs implied by these approaches by thinking about the 
following question: What sorts of demands would citizens need to meet in order for these 
pessimists to stop being worried about democracy? Both epistemic libertarians and epistocrats 
tend to have a fairly stringent view of what constitutes epistemic competence of voters in a 
democracy. They regard detailed information about government structures, political processes, 
and economics as relevant (perhaps even central) to our understanding of voter competency. As 
we’ll see below, optimists tend to reject these assumptions about the nature of PERs. 
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5. Optimism  
In stark opposition to both epistemic libertarians and epistocrats, “epistemic democrats” defend 
democracy in part on the basis of claims about its tendency to produce (epistemically) good 
decisions.6 Epistemic democrats tend to focus on the epistemic benefits of vote aggregation, the 
epistemic benefits of “deliberation”, or some combination of both. Aggregative and deliberative 
approaches may have different upshots for our understanding of the nature of citizens’ PERs.  
Starting with aggregative approaches, theorists tend to rely on versions of the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem (CJT), the “miracle of aggregation”, or ways in which the benefits of cognitive 
diversity can be reaped through aggregation processes. See Heléne Landemore’s excellent 
overview of CJT and the miracle of aggregation in her Chapter in this volume.7  
Here I will focus on the implications for PERs of the CJT approach, particularly as they arise 
from the so-called “competence” and “independence” conditions (Landemore 2020). We can 
draw these out by thinking about the following question: What sorts of demands would citizens 
need to meet in order for these conditions to be satisfied? Minimally, to satisfy the competence 
condition, it seems voters must be better than random at “getting things right”. The 
independence condition requires that the probability of one person being right on any binary 
question must be the same regardless of the probability of another person being right for that 
same question (Landemore 2013: 73). So, to satisfy the independence condition, it seems citizens 
must avoid being systematically influenced by others in casting their votes. There are any 
 
6 Not all epistemic democrats presuppose instrumentalism (Peter 2008).  
7 Prominent objections to CJT target the competence and independence conditions, along with other requirements 
such as that voters must be sincere, and that political decisions have correct outcomes. Robert Goodin and Kai 
Spiekermann (2018) build on classical versions of CJT, largely in response to these sorts of worries, resulting in a 
complex version of aggregative democracy (see also Landemore 2016: p.149-156, for an accessible, qualified 
defense). 
 12 
number of things we might take this to imply about the PERs of individuals—perhaps it 
corresponds with a demand of intellectual autonomy, or intellectual courage (Fairweather 
forthcoming). 
Despite the fact that according to these approaches much of the epistemic work is done 
by aggregation itself, citizens have a role to play at the individual level. To make this more vivid, 
note that the competence condition is cast in terms of probabilities of being right. There are at 
least two dimensions relevant to that probability: the individual’s abilities, and the environment 
in which they find themselves. When it comes to the latter dimension, note how hostile the 
epistemic environment is for citizens gathering political information: news outlets often put a 
great deal of spin on their reporting, personalization algorithms influence access to social media, 
politicians have agendas that can affect their presentation of information, and so on (Battaly 
2020). Even if citizens tend to have a high degree of epistemic competence, the probability of 
choosing the correct option may nevertheless be quite low, given this hostile environment. In this 
regard, perhaps the competence condition places a more stringent epistemic demand on 
individuals than it at first seems (cf. Worsnip 2018). 
Let’s turn to deliberative forms of epistemic democracy. “Deliberation” refers to the 
process of exchanging reasons and argumentation with the aim of reaching a decision. 
Deliberation takes place in many contexts—from within one’s own mind, to between citizens, to 
between elected legislators, and so on. In reality, decisions in a democracy are never reached 
through deliberation alone. At some point, a non-deliberative decision procedure, such as voting, 
must be used to settle residual disagreement. But the idea that deliberative epistemic democrats 
typically embrace is that deliberation: 
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• Enlarges the pools of ideas and information.  
• Weeds out good arguments from the bad.  
• Leads to a consensus on the “better” or “more reasonable” solution.   
(Landemore 2013: 97) 
 
Epistemic democrats such as Landemore (2013, 2020) and James Bohman (2006) emphasize that 
we shouldn’t expect deliberation, all by itself, to do these things; rather, deliberation must take 
place under constraints, which defenders of deliberative epistemic democracy argue democratic 
institutions can provide. In particular, it’s widely thought that diversity and inclusiveness are 
necessary conditions on the epistemic benefits of deliberation. Typically, not much is said in 
terms of specifics about what sorts of epistemic competences individuals must have for a 
deliberative process to achieve anything like i)-iii). There is also much controversy over the 
question of whether deliberation really is likely to do i), ii), or iii), or whether any of i)-iii) is 
necessary or sufficient for deliberation to reap the epistemic benefits claimed by epistemic 
democrats.  
One strategy for teasing out implications of deliberative epistemic democracy for our 
understanding of PERs is to look at some of the most compelling arguments against the 
epistemic benefits of deliberation, and ask: What sorts of demands would citizens need to meet 
in order for these arguments to fail? Hannon (forthcoming) has recently summarized a number of 
well-known arguments against the epistemic benefits of deliberation, highlighting empirical 
arguments for the pervasiveness of phenomena such as group polarization (Sunstein 2002), 
cultural cognition (Kahan et. al 2011), and motivated reasoning in a political deliberative context 
(Haidt 2012). If these really are a threat to the epistemic benefits of deliberation, then, minimally, 
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it would seem an epistemic demand on citizens, according to deliberative epistemic democracy, 
is that citizens have the epistemic competences needed (perhaps only after certain kinds of 
training) to render these threats unproblematic. However stringent PERs would have to be in this 
regard seems difficult to precisely specify. But this gives us at least a basic sense of the 
interaction between deliberative epistemic democracy and our understanding of PERs.  
Some proponents of the epistemic benefits of deliberation may be prepared to grant that 
individual citizens tend to fit the profile ascribed to them by those who advance these objections, 
but maintain that deliberation has epistemic benefits nonetheless. The idea is to argue that the 
epistemic benefits of deliberation are the result of collective or distributed features of 
deliberation, as opposed to facts about individuals involved. Landemore (2013) focuses on 
“models of cognitive diversity” (drawing on work by Lu Hong and Scott Page) to argue that, in 
both a deliberative and aggregative context, the epistemic value of democracy is not so much a 
function of individual epistemic ability, as it is “cognitive diversity” (understood as a plurality of 
modes of thinking and interpretations of the world) (Landemore 2020).   
On this latter picture, the main (epistemic) lesson of deliberative epistemic democracy for 
individuals is something like: be yourself! This is an upshot of the idea that the more diverse the 
deliberating group is, the better. There is a limit to the value of diversity—not all views should 
be taken into account—but this far from imagining that being a good citizen requires citizens to 
be up to date on the latest political issues, to have encyclopaedic knowledge of the mechanisms 
and structure of government, and a firm grasp of economics. The epistemic benefits of 
deliberation are such that, when large groups of people, with many different perspectives on an 
issue, contribute to the process of exchange of reasons, that group is likely to produce a better 
 15 
outcome than any subset of the group would produce (at least over time, over a long chain of 
decisions).  
 
6. Hybrid Views  
Some prominent defenses and critiques of democracy may not fit neatly within my taxonomy. To 
illustrate with just one example, start with the observation that the optimists and pessimists 
we’ve discussed so far have presupposed a “veritistic” conception of the epistemic benefits and 
drawbacks of democracy. Veritistic epistemic goods are epistemic goods that derive their value 
from the value of truth.  
Michael Hannon (forthcoming) has recently argued for a shift in focus towards non-
veritistic goods, such as “empathetic understanding”. Empathetic understanding is the ability to 
take up another person’s viewpoint, to be able to see why another person believes what they do 
(forthcoming: 9). Hannon’s view is motivated by a worry shared by many of the pessimists 
discussed above, namely that there are serious grounds for concern about citizens’ ability to be 
informed and rational in their political decision-making. But perhaps we shouldn’t see such 
goods as the aim of deliberative structures and processes in the first place. Another way of 
thinking about the epistemic goods that democratic participation both requires and tends to 
promote is in terms of empathetic understanding.8 To understand others, we need to empathize 
with their thinking, and this minimally requires: 
 
• Being willing to listen. 
 
8 Hannon couches his epistemic defense of democracy in terms of epistemic benefits to individuals, as opposed to 
epistemic benefits democracy has for society’s decision-making as a whole. See Hannon (forthcoming: 21) for 
discussion of whether empathetic understanding really is a non-veritistic epistemic good. 
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• Having the ability to take up another person’s perspective. 
 
Hannon argues that, provided citizens meet these conditions, democratic deliberation will 
promote empathetic understanding amongst the citizenry (which may in turn promote other good 
things). And that might be one reason to think deliberative democracy is a good idea, in 
comparison with other democratic models, such as pure aggregation models. According to this 
picture, we might say that the PERs of citizens in a democracy include a responsibility towards 
empathetically understanding other citizens. As Hannon acknowledges, there is room for debate 
about whether empathetic understanding is a genuinely epistemic good (forthcoming: 20). If one 
were to disagree about that, then, given his skepticism about veritistic forms of deliberative 
epistemic democracy, we might be tempted to place him somewhere on a hazy line between 
pessimism and non-epistemicism.9 
 
7. What Counts as Competence, and How It’s Determined  
As we’ve seen, pessimists tend to rely on survey data about political ignorance in challenging 
democracy, in addition to a priori arguments about the incentives of voters. There are a number 
of interconnected issues we can raise about this sort of reliance on survey data, as well as these a 
priori arguments. 
Arthur Lupia (2016) has argued that a good deal of work needs to be done by pessimists 
to articulate a clear logic getting them from claims about survey data, to claims about voter 
competence (see esp. Ch 15 and 16). A closely related issue surrounds the use of “political 
 
9 Anne Jeffreys’ “limited epistocracy” (2018) and David Estlund’s (2008) “epistemic proceduralism” strike me as 
other potential hybrid views.  
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knowledge scales” to arrive at conclusions about citizens’ political knowledge. Surveys such as 
the American National Elections Studies (ANES) simply aggregate the scores of individuals’ 
answers to a small set of questions about politics. While these questions are chosen for specific 
reasons—presumably with the aim of making them representative of “political knowledge”—
Lupia argues that there is simply no evidence that political knowledge scales like those of the 
ANES are representative of anything we can fairly label “political knowledge”. Rather, they may 
well be representative of much more specific kinds of knowledge (and ignorance), which, as 
Lupia also argues, may or may not be a necessary or sufficient condition on having a high-value 
competence relevant to democratic participation (Lupia 2016: Ch. 16). The basic issue here is 
about how the term “political knowledge” tends to be operationalized in various studies (cf. 
Landemore 2013: 199-200).10  
Optimists have much to say about how citizens who don’t know much about the sorts of 
things asked on political-knowledge surveys can contribute valuably to the democratic process. 
Often, (as seen with Landemore) authors focus on how informational and cognitive processes in 
a democracy are distributed. Others rely more heavily on claims about citizen use of 
“information shortcuts”, heuristics enabling people to make the same decisions with respect to 
some set of options that they would if they were “fully informed” about the options. Examples of 
information shortcuts frequently discussed in the literature include: party identification, 
 
10 Additional issues in this area include how survey questions are posed, and the context in which questions are 
asked. For example, significant differences arise when participants are offered a dollar for each correct answer to a 
survey question, or given 24 hours to respond (Prior & Lupia 2008: 169). Also, the way accuracy of participant 
answers is measured is crucial. What counts as a “correct” answer or “nearly correct” answer to certain questions 
can sometimes be fuzzy to interpret (Lupia 2016: 209).  
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retrospective evaluations of the economy, and relying on opinion leaders (for influential work on 
this topic, see Popkin 1994; Robertson 1976; Lupia & McCubbins 1998).  
Thomas Christiano, a prominent defender of democracy against empirically-based 
worries about voter ignorance and irrationality, focuses on the division of intellectual labour and 
the use of information shortcuts in democratic societies; he’s developed an expansive account of 
the resources available to citizens in contributing to the democratic process (2015; 2018). 
Christiano points to the fact that real-world political deliberation happens across numerous 
levels, from citizens, to experts, to opinion leaders, and politicians. Each level plays a different 
role in deliberation, requiring different kinds of intellectual capacities. Real-world polities rely 
on a stratification of deliberative tasks. Even within levels—at the level of ordinary 
conversations amongst citizens about politics, for example—people can rely on one another 
(along with other information shortcuts) in a division of intellectual labour. For example, John 
might happen to know a good deal about climate change, but not much about foreign policy. 
John’s friend Linda might be in the opposite position. Christiano suggests that, as long as certain 
conditions are met—such as each person having relevant background knowledge about the 
other—John and Linda can reasonably trust one another’s say-so when it comes to politically 
relevant factual information on these topics. As externalists in epistemology are well aware, 
lacking the ability to positively justify one’s beliefs on a given topic need not undermine the 
possibility that one’s beliefs are warranted (Christiano 2015: 261).  
We can also push back on Downsian claims about incentives of voters to be informed and 
rational when voting in large representative democracies. Mackie (2012) has argued that Downs’ 
idea presupposes a mistaken model of why people vote in the first place. Mackie argues for a 
“contributory model”, according to which the aim of voting isn’t merely to get someone to win, 
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but also to show that whoever you’re voting for, even if they lose, has a certain mandate behind 
them.  
 There is of course much room for debate about the efficacy of mechanisms for the 
division of cognitive labor, as well as voter incentives to be informed.11 But this section has 
canvassed some ways one might challenge the degree of stringency assumed in many pessimistic 
views about PERs. Moreover, it has explained why, even if pessimists are right about stringency, 
it’s far from clear that we have an accurate picture of whether or to what extent citizens really do 
tend to fall short of their PERs.  
 
8. Conclusion  
We have identified a number of important choice points for our understanding of PERs of 
citizens in a democracy.  
• Views may differ on the question of whether PERs are R(normative) or merely 
R(functional) responsibilities.  
• They may also differ on the question of stringency—for instance, on the extent to 
which technical, detailed information about government structures, political 
processes, and economics are relevant to voter competence.  
• There may also be room for debate about whether PERs should be understood in 
veritistic or non-veritistic terms.  
By placing some prominent views in democratic theory within the three-pronged distinction 
between non-epistemicism, pessimism, and optimism, we have been able to draw out these 
possibilities, while keeping their broader implications for our understanding of democracy in 
 
11 For a helpful summary of some compelling pessimistic responses, see (Somin 2015: 386-389). 
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view. I have also suggested that there is room for a fairly minimal approach to PERs—one that, 
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